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Abstract. Traditional approaches to Quantitative Information Flow
(QIF) represent the adversary’s prior knowledge of possible secret val-
ues as a single probability distribution. This representation may miss
important structure. For instance, representing prior knowledge about
passwords of a system’s users in this way overlooks the fact that many
users generate passwords using some strategy. Knowledge of such strate-
gies can help the adversary in guessing a secret, so ignoring them may
underestimate the secret’s vulnerability. In this paper we explicitly model
strategies as distributions on secrets, and generalize the representation
of the adversary’s prior knowledge from a distribution on secrets to an
environment, which is a distribution on strategies (and, thus, a distribu-
tion on distributions on secrets, called a hyper-distribution). By apply-
ing information-theoretic techniques to environments we derive several
meaningful generalizations of the traditional approach to QIF. In par-
ticular, we disentangle the vulnerability of a secret from the vulnerability
of the strategies that generate secrets, and thereby distinguish security
by aggregation—which relies on the uncertainty over strategies—from
security by strategy—which relies on the intrinsic uncertainty within a
strategy. We also demonstrate that, in a precise way, no further gener-
alization of prior knowledge (e.g., by using distributions of even higher
order) is needed to soundly quantify the vulnerability of the secret.
1 Introduction
Two core principles within the field of quantitative information flow (QIF) are:
(i) a secret is considered “vulnerable” to the extent the adversary’s prior knowl-
edge about secret values has low entropy; and (ii) the leakage of information in
a system is a measure of how much the observable behavior of the system, while
processing a secret value, degrades that entropy. These principles have been used
to create ever more sophisticated QIF frameworks to model systems and reason
about leakage. (See, for example, [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].)
Traditional approaches to QIF represent the adversary’s prior knowledge as
a probability distribution on secret values. This representation is adequate when
secrets are generated according to a single, possibly randomized, procedure that
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is known to the adversary (e.g., when a cryptographic key is randomly generated
according to a known algorithm). However, in some important situations secrets
are generated according to a more complex structure. In these cases, representing
the prior as a distribution loses important, security-relevant information.
Consider the example of passwords. If an adversary gains access to a large col-
lection of passwords (without the associated user identities), his prior knowledge
can be modeled as the probability distribution over passwords corresponding to
the relative frequency of passwords in the collection. It would be wrong to be-
lieve, however, that passwords are generated by a function exactly described
by this distribution. This representation of prior knowledge aggregates a popu-
lation of users into a single expected probabilistic behavior, whereas in fact it
is more likely that individual users generate passwords according to some (not
completely random) strategy. Some user born in 1983, for instance, may have a
strategy of generally picking passwords containing the substring “1983”. If an
adversary knows this, he can guess relevant passwords more quickly. In addition,
on a system that mandates password changes, he may have an advantage when
guessing that a changed password by the same user contains “1983” as a sub-
string. In short, if the adversary learns something about the secret-generating
strategy, he may obtain additional information about the secret itself.
Generally speaking, knowledge of strategies can be useful when multiple se-
crets are produced by a same source. For example, the same user might use
a similar strategy to generate passwords on different web sites. If we consider
locations as secret, then changes in location are surely correlated, e.g., based
on time of day. Learning someone’s strategy for moving in a city may increase
the chances of guessing this person’s location at a future point in time. Perhaps
surprisingly, an evolving secret subject to repeated observations, in some cases,
can be learned faster if it is changed (and observed) more often [14]. The reason
is that the strategy by which the secret changes is revealed faster if more sam-
ples from the strategy are visible to an adversary; and if the strategy has little
randomness in it, the adversary has an increased accuracy in determining past,
current, and even future secret values.
This paper develops the idea that when secrets are generated according to a
plurality of strategies, as in the above examples, it is advisable to represent the
adversary’s prior as a hyper-distribution of secrets, i.e., a distribution of distri-
butions. To show this, we first define a system model that explicitly considers
strategies for generating secrets. We formalize a strategy as a probability dis-
tribution from which secrets can be sampled. We assume there is a probability
distribution on strategies themselves, which we call an environment, represent-
ing how likely it is that each strategy will be used for generating the secret.
Returning to the password example, each user would have his own probability
distribution for generating secrets (i.e., his own strategy), and the environment
would consist in a probability distribution over these strategies, representing the
chance of each user being the one logging into the system.
In this model, representing the adversary’s prior as a distribution on secrets
would reflect the expected behavior of all possible strategies in the environment.
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By quantifying the prior vulnerability as a function of this single distribution,
traditional approaches would miss relevant information, underestimating the vul-
nerability of the secret for adversaries able to learn the strategy being used. By
modeling the prior as a hyper-distribution, and applying information-theoretic
reasoning on it, we can do better, generalizing the traditional approach to QIF.
More specifically, we make the following contributions.
– We generalize the traditional measure of prior adversarial vulnerability to
environmental vulnerability, which takes into account that the adversary can
learn the strategy for generating secrets. (Section 3.)
– We define a measure of strategy vulnerability, which quantifies how certain an
adversary is about the secret-generating strategy itself. We demonstrate that
the traditional measure of prior vulnerability on secrets neatly decomposes
into environmental and strategy vulnerability. Using this decomposition, we
are able to disentangle two types of security usually conflated in the tradi-
tional approach to QIF: security by strategy, which arises from the intrin-
sic randomness of secret-generating strategies, and security by aggregation,
which arises from the adversary’s inability to identify particular strategies
in the secret-generation process. (Section 4.)
– We define models of knowledge for adversaries who can only partially identify
strategies, and we provide measures of the vulnerability of the secret and of
the strategies themselves for this type of adversary. (Section 5.)
– We demonstrate that the modeling of the adversary’s prior knowledge as a
hyper-distribution on secrets is sufficiently precise: more complicated models
(e.g., distributions on distributions on distributions on secrets, and such
“higher order distributions”) add no expressive power. (Section 6.)
– Our work lays a foundation for reasoning about real-world scenarios. In this
paper we develop an example based on a real password dataset. (Section 7.)
The next section introduces some preliminary concepts while Sections 3–7
present our main results. Finally, Section 8 discusses related work, and Section 9
concludes. This is an extended version of a conference paper[15] that includes
additional notes about hyper-distributions and proofs in the appendices.
2 Preliminaries
We briefly review standard concepts and notation from quantitative information
flow (QIF). Notably we define notions of “secret”, an adversary’s “prior knowl-
edge” about the secret (or simply, “prior”), and an “information measure” to
gauge that knowledge. We also define “channels”, probabilistic mappings from a
set of secrets to another set, which have the effect of updating the adversary’s un-
certainty about the secret from a prior probability distribution to a distribution
on distributions on secrets, called a “hyper-distribution”.
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Secrets and vulnerability A secret is some piece of sensitive information we
want to protect, such as a user’s password, social security number or current
location. An adversary usually only has partial information about the value of
a secret, referred to as “the prior.” Traditionally, the prior is represented as a
probability distribution; our aim in this paper is to show that an alternative
representation can be more useful. We denote by X the set of possible secrets
and by DX the set of probability distributions over X . We typically use pi to
denote a probability distribution, and dpie for its support (the set of values with
non-zero probability).
An information measure is a function VX :DX→R mapping distributions
on secrets to real numbers. An information measure can gauge vulnerability—
the higher the value, the less secure the secret is—or uncertainty/entropy—the
higher the value, the more secure the secret is. There are several definitions of
information measures in the literature, varying according to the operational in-
terpretation of the measure. Popular instances include Bayes vulnerability [8]
and Bayes risk [16], Shannon entropy [17], and guessing entropy [18]. The g-
vulnerability framework [19] was recently introduced to express information mea-
sures having richer operational interpretations; we discuss it further below.
Hypers and channels A hyper-distribution [20] (or hyper for short) is a dis-
tribution on distributions. As we will see in the next section, we propose that
the prior can be profitably represented as a hyper. A hyper on the set X is of
type D2X , which stands for D(DX ), a distribution on distributions on X . The
elements of DX are called the inner-distributions (or inners) of the hyper. The
distribution the hyper has on inners is called the outer-distribution (or outer).
We usually use H to denote a hyper, dHe for its support (the set of inners with
non-zero probability), and [pi] to denote the point-hyper assigning probability 1
to the inner pi.
An (information theoretic) channel is a triple (X ,Y, C), where X ,Y are finite
sets of input values and output values, resp., and C is a |X |×|Y| channel matrix in
which each entry C(x, y) corresponds to the probability of the channel producing
output y when the input is x. Hence each row of C is a probability distribution
over Y (entries are non-negative and sum to 1). A channel is deterministic iff
each row contains a single 1 identifying the only possible output for that input.
A distribution pi:DX and a channel C from X to Y induce a joint distribu-
tion p(x, y)=pi(x)C(x, y) on X×Y, producing joint random variables X,Y with
marginal probabilities p(x)=
∑
y p(x, y) and p(y)=
∑
x p(x, y), and conditional
probabilities p(y|x)=p(x,y)/p(x) (if p(x) is non-zero) and p(x|y)=p(x,y)/p(y) (if p(y)
is non-zero). Note that pXY is the unique joint distribution that recovers pi and
C, in that p(x)=pix and p(y|x)=C(x, y) (if p(x) is non-zero). 4 For a given y
(s.t. p(y) is non-zero), the conditional probabilities p(x|y) for each x ∈ X form
the posterior distribution pX|y.
A channel C from a set X of secret values to set Y of observable values
can be used to model computations on secrets. Assuming the adversary has
4 To avoid ambiguity, we may use subscripts on distributions , e.g., pXY , pY or pX|Y .
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prior knowledge pi about the secret value, knows how a channel C works, and
can observe the channel’s outputs, the effect of the channel is to update the
adversary’s knowledge from pi to a collection of posteriors pX|y, each occurring
with probability p(y). Hence, following [20, 12], we view a channel as producing
hyper-distribution. 5 We use [pi,C] to denote the hyper obtained by the action
of C on pi. We say that [pi,C] is the result of pushing prior pi through channel C.
Notation on expectations We denote the expected value of some random vari-
able F :X→R over a distribution pi:DX byEpi F def= Ex←pi F (x)def=
∑
x∈X pi(x)F (x).
Here, R is usually the reals R but more generally can be a vector space. If X
itself is a vector space, then we abbreviate Epi (id) by just E pi, the “average” of
the distribution pi on X .
g-vulnerability Recently, the g-vulnerability framework [19] proposed a family
of vulnerability measures that capture various adversarial models. Its operational
scenario is parameterized by a set W of guesses (possibly infinite) that the
adversary can make about the secret, and a gain function g:W×X→R. The gain
g(w, x) expresses the adversary’s benefit for having made the guess w when the
actual secret is x. Given a distribution pi, the g-vulnerability function measures
the adversary’s success as the expected gain of an optimal guessing strategy:
Vg(pi)
def
= max
w∈W
∑
x∈X
pi(x)g(w, x).
The g-vulnerability of a hyper H:D2X is defined as
Vg[H]
def
= E
H
Vg. (1)
In particular, when H is the result of pushing distribution pi:DX through a chan-
nel C from X to Y we have Vg[pi,C]=
∑
y∈Y maxw∈W
∑
x∈X pi(x)C(x, y)g(w, x).
The set of g-vulnerabilities coincides with the set of all convex and continuous
information measures, which recently have been shown to be precisely those to
satisfy a set of basic axioms for information measures. 6
Theorem 1 (Expressiveness of g-vulnerabilities [21]). Any g-vulnerability
Vg is a continuous and convex function on DX . Moreover, given any continuous
and convex function VX :DX→R+ there exists a gain function g with a countable
set of guesses such that VX=Vg.
In the remainder of this paper we will consider only vulnerabilities that are
continuous and convex (although all of our results carry on for continuous and
concave uncertainty measures). We may alternate between the notation VX and
Vg for vulnerabilities depending on whether we want to emphasize the g-function
associated with the measure via Theorem 1.
5 Mappings of priors to hypers are called abstract channels in [12].
6 More precisely, if the vulnerability of a hyper is defined as the expectation of the
vulnerability of its inners (as for Vg in Equation (1)), it respects the data-processing
inequality and always yields non-negative leakage iff the vulnerability is convex.
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3 Adversarial knowledge as hyper-distributions
This section shows how an adversary’s prior knowledge can be profitably repre-
sented as a hyper-distribution on secrets, rather than simply a distribution. We
begin by presenting a basic system model for wherein secrets are not necessarily
generated according to a single “strategy”, but rather an “environment”, which
is a distribution on strategies. This change motivates an adversary who can learn
about the strategy being used, and from that pose a higher threat to the secret.
This notion, which we call “environmental vulnerability”, strictly generalizes the
standard notion of vulnerability.
3.1 Strategies and environments
Fig. 1: System and its context.
Figure 1 illustrates our basic model.
A system is a probabilistic mapping
from secret inputs to public outputs,
represented as a channel. 7 Secrets are
produced according to a strategy cho-
sen by a defender.
A strategy is modeled as a probability distribution on the set of secrets
X= {x1, x2, . . . , xn}; i.e., the defender chooses the secret by sampling the distri-
bution. The set S of all possible strategies is thus DX , but in this paper we shall
assume that there is a set SX={pi1, pi2, . . . , pim} ⊂ DX of strategies of interest. 8
In traditional QIF, this defender strategy is essentially synonymous with
prior knowledge—we assume the adversary knows exactly the strategy being
used. However, as motivated by the password example in the introduction, in
reality a secret may be generated by a myriad of possible strategies, and each
strategy may be more or less likely. We represent this idea in our model as an
environment, which is a probabilistic rule used to choose the secret-generating
strategy; it is represented as a probability distribution on the set SX of strategies
of interest. The set DSX of all possible environments is a subset of the set D2X of
all hypers on X . In case only one strategy pi is possible, as in traditional models,
the corresponding environment is the point-hyper [pi]. We will use letters like H,
M, En to denote hypers that are distributions on strategies of interest.
pi1 pi2 pi3
x1 1 0 1/2
x2 0 1 1/2
En1 1/2 1/2 0
En2 0 0 1
Table 1: Example 1.
Example 1. Consider a password-checking system. There
are various methods for choosing passwords, each of which
can be represented as a different strategy; which strategy
is used by a particular user is determined by an environ-
ment. The adversary is interested in identifying the pass-
word used for a particular user. For simplicity, we limit at-
tention to two possible values for passwords, X={x1, x2}.
7 Prior systems often also permit public inputs and secret outputs; we leave such
generalizations to future work.
8 Given that X is finite, we can make SX finite via a discretization that defines an
indivisible amount µ of probability mass that strategies can allocate among secrets.
Any precision in strategies can be achieved by making µ as small as needed.
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Consider the set of possible strategies for generating secrets is SX={pi1, pi2, pi3},
where pi1=[1, 0] always generates secret x1, pi2=[0, 1] always generates secret x2,
and pi3=[1/2, 1/2] generates either secret with equal probability. Consider also two
possible environments for this system:
– En1=[1/2, 1/2, 0] is the environment in which strategies pi1 and pi2 may be
adopted with equal probability. This represents a scenario in which any user
logging in has an equal probability of having generated his password either
according to strategy pi1 or according to strategy pi2.
– En2=[0, 0, 1] is the environment in which strategy pi3 is always adopted.
This represents a scenario in which every user logging is assured to having
generated his password using strategy pi3.
We depict strategies and environments in Table 1. The columns list strate-
gies; the first grouping of rows contains the definition of the strategy (i.e., the
probability that it chooses a particular secret), and the next grouping of rows
contains the definition of each environment, one per row, which gives the prob-
ability of each strategy. uunionsq
3.2 Prior knowledge as a hyper, and environmental vulnerability
Given a model with an environment En, we can continue to represent the prior
in the traditional manner, as a distribution on secrets pi. We call this prior the
concise knowledge of the environment, and it is defined as the expectation of all
strategies of En, i.e., pi=E En. When this equation holds, we also say that pi is
consistent with En; when needed we may denote by piEn the prior consistent with
environment En. For instance, consistent, concise knowledge of users’ passwords
in Example 1 would be the expectation of how a randomly picked user would
generate their password: each user may potentially adopt a unique strategy for
generating their password, and the prior captures the expected behavior of the
population of users.
Alternatively, we can represent the prior as a hyper M, representing the ad-
versary’s unabridged knowledge of the environment En. For now, we will assume
an adversary knows the environment En precisely, i.e., M=En, just as, in tradi-
tional QIF, it is often assumed that the adversary precisely knows the defender’s
single secret-generating strategy. Later, in Section 5, we will introduce the notion
of a abstraction M, which is model consistent with an environment En, but that
does not match it exactly; this allows us to model partial adversary knowledge.
Given this new notion of prior (i.e., unabridged knowledge), we must de-
fine a corresponding notion of the vulnerability of a secret. We call this notion
environmental vulnerability.
Definition 1 (Environmental vulnerability). Given a vulnerability mea-
sure VX :DX→R, the environmental vulnerability of the secret is a function
VenX :D2X→R of the environment En defined as
VenX (En)
def
= E
En
VX .
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It is easy to show that if the environment En is a point-hyper [pi], environmen-
tal vulnerability VenX (En) collapses into traditional prior vulnerability VX(pi).
Proposition 1. For all environments En, if En=[pi] then VenX (En)=VX(pi).
The converse of Proposition 1, however, is not true, i.e., VenX (En)=VX(pi)
does not imply En=[pi]. We can also show that, in expectation, an adversary
with unabridged knowledge En can never be worse-off than an adversary with
concise knowledge piEn.
Proposition 2. For any vulnerability VX , VenX (En)≥VX(piEn) for all environ-
ments En.
Proposition 2 shows that the modeling of adversarial knowledge as only a
distribution on secrets overlooks how the adversary can exploit knowledge of the
environment. Indeed, as the next example shows, secrets distributed according
to a same prior may present drastically different environmental vulnerability.
Example 2. Consider the password system of Example 1. Both environments
yield the same prior distribution pi=E En1=E En2=[1/2, 1/2], so an adversary
with only concise knowledge would obtain the same traditional prior vulnerabil-
ity in both environments. E.g., for Bayes vulnerability, defined as
V(Bayes)X (pi)
def
= max
x∈X
pi(x), (2)
the adversary would obtain a traditional prior vulnerability of V(Bayes)X (pi)=1/2.
However, an adversary with unabridged knowledge would obtain different
values for the vulnerability of the secret in each environment. In En1 envi-
ronmental vulnerability is Ven(Bayes)X (En1)=1/2·V(Bayes)X (pi1)+1/2·V(Bayes)X (pi2) =
1/2·1+1/2·1=1, whereas in En2 environmental vulnerability is Ven(Bayes)X (En2) =
1·V(Bayes)X (pi3)=1·1/2=1/2 (recall that higher is worse for the defender).
Note that in En2, the value for environmental vulnerability and traditional
prior vulnerability is the same (Ven(Bayes)X (En2) = V
(Bayes)
X (pi)=1/2), so an ad-
versary who learns the strategy being used is not expected to be more successful
than an adversary who only knows the prior. uunionsq
4 Security by aggregation and security by strategy
In this section we discuss further the advantage of using a hyper as the prior,
showing how it can distinguish two types of security guarantees that are conflated
when the prior is merely a distribution: security “by aggregation” and security
“by strategy”. We also show that the traditional definition of prior vulnerability
decomposes neatly into environmental vulnerability and “strategy vulnerabil-
ity”, which measures the information the adversary has about the strategy used
to generate secrets.
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4.1 Dissecting the security guarantees of traditional prior
vulnerability
The final example in the last section provides some insights about the security
guarantees implied by traditional prior vulnerability. First, security by aggrega-
tion occurs when environmental vulnerability (largely) exceeds traditional prior
vulnerability: VenX (En)VX(piEn). In this case the secret is protected by the ad-
versary’s lack of knowledge of the strategy being used, and, if the adversary
learns the strategy, the vulnerability of the secret can (significantly) increase.
An example of security by aggregation is a scenario in which all users pick pass-
words with deterministic strategies, but the adversary does not know which user
is generating the password. If there is a large number of users, and if their strate-
gies are varied enough, the passwords may be considered “secure” only as long
as the adversary cannot use knowledge about the environment to identify the
strategy being used.
On the other hand, security by strategy occurs when environmental and prior
vulnerabilities have similar values: VenX (En)≈VX(piEn). In this case the secret is
protected by the unpredictability (or uncertainty) within the strategies that
generate the secret, so even if the strategy becomes known, the vulnerability of
the secret will not increase significantly. An example of security by strategy is a
bank system in which user PINs are chosen uniformly. Even if the algorithm is
known to the adversary, the vulnerability of the secret is not increased.
In Section 4.3 we define measures of the two types of security discussed above,
but for that we need first to formalize the concept of strategy vulnerability.
4.2 Strategy vulnerability
We now turn our attention to how the knowledge of an environment reflects on
the adversary’s knowledge about the strategy being used to generate secrets. For
that we will define a measure VstS :DS→R of strategy vulnerability.
Our measure should cover two key points. First, it should reflect how certain
an adversary is about which strategy is being used to generate secrets, indepen-
dently of whether the strategy itself is deterministic or random. In particular,
it must distinguish between environments in which the adversary knows exactly
the strategy being used, but that strategy happens to employ randomization (in
which case strategy vulnerability should be high) from environments in which
the adversary does not know what strategy is being used, even if all possible
strategies are deterministic (in which case strategy vulnerability should be low).
Second, the measure should characterize environments that are “predictable”
from the point of view of the adversary. The key insight is that VstS (En) should
consider the “similarity” among strategies in the support of En. From the point
of view of the adversary, whose goal is to “guess the secret” (or, more precisely, to
exploit his knowledge about the secret according to some information measure
VX :DX→R of interest), two strategies should be considered “similar” if they
yield “similar” vulnerabilities of the secret, as measured according to this VX .
The following example motivates this reasoning.
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pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4
x1 1 0 1/2 9/10
x2 0 1 1/2 1/10
En1 1/2 1/2 0 0
En2 0 0 1 0
En3 1/2 0 0 1/2
Table 2: Example 3.
Example 3. Consider an extension from Example 1,
adding a strategy pi4 and environment En3, depicted
in Table 2. Intuitively, strategy vulnerability should be
high in En2=[pi3], since an adversary would know ex-
actly the strategy being used. But what should be the
strategy vulnerability in En1 and in En3?
Suppose we simply considered the set SX of strate-
gies as our set of secrets, and defined VstS as the Bayes
vulnerability w.r.t. that set: VstS
(∗)
(En)
def?
= maxpi∈S En(pi) . As expected we
would have VstS
(∗)
(En2)=1, but since in each environment En1 and En3 there
are two possible strategies, each with probability 1/2, we would then have
VstS
(∗)
(En1)=1/2, and VstS
(∗)
(En3)=1/2. But this seems wrong: we are assigning
the same measure of vulnerability to both En1 and En3, but these two environ-
ments are very different. The possible strategies in En1 never produce the same
secret, whereas the strategies of En3 produce secrets x1 and x2 with similar
probabilities. VstS
(∗)
ascribes En1 and En3 the same measure even though the
uncertainty about the strategy under knowledge of En3 seems much lower than
En1. For instance, if the adversary is interested in guessing the secret correctly
in one try, an adversary who knows En3 would always guess the secret to be x1
and would be right most of the time, but an adversary who knows En1 gains no
advantage about which secret to guess. In short, for this type of adversary we
want VstS (En2)>VstS (En3)>VstS (En1), but VstS
(∗)
fails to satisfy this ordering. uunionsq
These observations lead us to define the vulnerability of a strategy in terms of
the difference in accuracy, as measured by a choice of VX , of an adversary acting
according to its full knowledge of the environment En and an adversary betting
according to the expected behavior piEn=E En of the environment. The key intu-
ition is that a strategy is, for practical purposes, known within an environment
when VX(piEn)≈VenX (En), or, equivalently, VX(E En)≈EEnVX .
Definition 2 (Strategy vulnerability.). Given a vulnerability VX , the strat-
egy vulnerability in environment En is defined as the ratio
VstS (En)
def
=
VX(piEn)
VenX (En)
.
By Proposition 2, VstS (En)≤1, and it is maximum when VX(piEn)=VenX (En).
As for a lower bound, it can be shown that strategy vulnerability is minimum
when the adversary’s measure of interest is Bayes vulnerability.
Proposition 3. Given any vulnerability VX , strategy vulnerability is bounded
by VstS (En)≥V(Bayes)X (piEn)/Ven(Bayes)X (En) for all environments En.
The following example illustrates how Definition 2 covers the two key points.
Example 4. Consider the scenario from Example 3, but assume an adversary A
is only interested in the chances of correctly guessing the secret in one try, no
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Adversary A Adversary B
En Prior piEn V(A)X (piEn) V
en(A)
X (En) V
st(A)
S (En) V
(B)
X (piEn) V
en(B)
X (En) V
st(B)
S (En)
En1 [1/2, 1/2] 1/2 1 1/2 4 3/4 5 1/4 95/105
En2 [1/2, 1/2] 1/2 1/2 1 4 3/4 4 3/4 1
En3 [19/20, 1/20] 19/20 19/20 1 9 1/2 195/200 38/39
Table 3: Environmental, strategy, and traditional prior vulnerabilities for Ex. 4.
matter what the secret is, whereas an adversary B also wants to guess the secret
in one try, but considers secret x2 as 9.5 times more valuable than secret x1
(say, for instance, that secrets are passwords to bank accounts, and one of the
accounts has 9.5 times more money than the other).
Mathematically, adversary A’s measure of success is represented by the vul-
nerability V(A)X =V
(Bayes)
X defined in Equation (2). As for adversary B, the vul-
nerability V(B)X can be defined as a g-vulnerability where the setW of guesses of
guesses is the same as the set X of secrets, and the gain function g is such that
g(xi, xj) equals 1 when i=j=1, equals 9.5 when i=j=2, and equals 0 when i6=j.
Table 3 shows the environmental, strategy, and traditional prior vulnerabili-
ties for each adversary in each environment. Note that the calculated values sub-
stantiate the intuitions we argued for in Example 3. For both adversaries strat-
egy vulnerability is maximum in environment En2 (Vst(A)S (En2)=V
st(B)
S (En2)=1),
and it is higher in environment En3 than in environment En1.
In particular for environment En3, the obtained value Vst(A)S (En3)=1 meets
our intuition that, for practical purposes, adversary A has little uncertainty
about the strategy being used: if all he cares about is to guess the secret in one
try, the differences between the possible strategies are too small to provoke any
change in A’s behavior. On the other hand, the obtained value Vst(B)S (En3)=
38/39≈0.97 reflects our intuition that in the same environment adversary B has
more uncertainty about the strategy being used: the differences in each possible
strategy are significant enough to induce changes in B’s behavior. uunionsq
4.3 Measures of security by aggregation and by strategy
In this section we provide measures of the two types of security—by aggregation
and by strategy—motivated in Section 4.1. The key idea is to observe that
Definition 2 is consistent with the decomposition of traditional prior vulnerability
into the product of strategy vulnerability and environmental vulnerability, and
that these two factors are measures of security by aggregation and security by
strategy, respectively:
VX(pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
perceived security
= VstS (En)︸ ︷︷ ︸
security by aggregation
× VenX (En)︸ ︷︷ ︸
security by strategy
. (3)
Equation (3) states that any fixed amount of traditional prior vulnerability
(i.e., perceived security) can be allocated among strategy and environmental vul-
nerability in different proportions, but in such a way that when one increases,
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the other must decrease to compensate for it. Environmental vulnerability is a
meaningful measure of security by strategy because it quantifies the intrinsic un-
certainty about how secrets are generated within each possible strategy. Indeed,
when strategies are random, this uncertainty cannot be avoided. On the other
hand, security by aggregation is a measure of the decrease in the adversary’s
effectiveness caused by his lack of knowledge of the environment.
Example 5. Environments En1 and En2 from Example 4 yield the same per-
ceived security for an adversary with concise knowledge; e.g., for adversary A,
V(A)X (piEn1)=V
(A)
X (En2)=1/2. However, each environment allocates this perceived
security differently. W.r.t. adversary A, En1 has minimum security by strategy
(Ven(A)X (En1)=1), and maximum security by aggregation (V
st(A)
S (En1)=1/2). Con-
versely, environment En2 has maximum security by strategy (Ven(A)X (En1)=1/2),
and minimum security by aggregation (Vst(A)S (En1)=1). Note that this quantita-
tive analysis precisely characterize intuitions for the distinction among the two
types of security motivated in Example 2. uunionsq
A note on the chain rule for information measures. Equation (3) is not
a trivial analogue of the chain-rule for information measures. For a start, most
information measures do not follow any traditional form of the chain rule. 9
Even for Shannon entropy, which respects the chain rule, the decomposition
of entropies of random variables S, X corresponding to strategies and secrets,
respectively, would be H(X,S)=H(S)+H(X | S). But even if it is reasonable to
equate H(X | S) to “environmental entropy” of the secret given the strategy is
known, H(S) cannot be equated with “strategy entropy” if we want the sum of
both values to be equal to H(X), which is the “entropy of the secret”. In other
words, H(S) does not seem to be a reasonable measure of “strategy entropy”
(in fact, H(S) would be a function on the distribution on strategies only, so
it would fail to take into account the similarity among strategies). However,
we can derive that H(X)=I(X;S)+H(X | S), which would suggest that an
appropriate measure of “strategy entropy” is actually I(X;S). This is in line
with our definition of strategy vulnerability as the amount of information the
environment carries about the secret.
5 Models of adversarial partial knowledge
Starting from Section 3.2 we assumed that prior knowledge represented as a
hyper exactly matches the environment En. However, in real-world settings the
adversary is likely only to know some features of the environment, but not its
9 In particular, Bayes vulnerability does not: in general
V (Bayes)(X,Y ) 6=V (Bayes)(X)·V (Bayes)(Y | X). As an example, consider the
joint distribution p on X={x1, x2} and Y={y1, y2} s.t. p(x1, y1)=1/2, p(x2, y1)=0,
and p(x1, y2)=p(x2, y2)=1/4. Then V
(Bayes)(X)=V (Bayes)(Y | X)=3/4, but
V (Bayes)(X,Y )=1/2, and the chain rule is not respected.
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pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5 pi6
x1 1 0 1/2 1/4 3/4 1/3
x2 0 1 1/2 3/4 1/4 2/3
En 1/10 1/10 2/10 3/10 2/10 1/10
(a) Environment En (i.e., model
for adversary with unabridged
knowledge).
piA piB piC
x1 1/2 7/20 11/18
x2 1/2 13/20 7/18
F 2/10 5/10 3/10
(b) Model F for adver-
sary who can identify
states of the federation.
piEn
x1 11/24
x2 13/24
[piEn] 1
(c) Model [piEn]
for adversary with
concise knowledge.
Table 4: Environment and models of adversary’s knowledge for Example 6
complete structure. As such, in this section we develop the notion of a “model”
that is hyper on secrets representing an adversary’s partial knowledge of that
environment. By employing “abstractions” of the environment as models, we are
able to generalize prior, environmental, and strategy vulnerability, and to provide
a stronger version of the “decomposition rule” for security of Equation (3).
5.1 Models of partial knowledge as abstractions of the environment
A model of adversarial knowledge is a hyper M:DSX , representing the adversary’s
knowledge about how secrets are generated. Each inner pij in M corresponds to
a strategy the adversary can interpret as possibly generating a secret, and the
corresponding outer probability M(pij) represents the probability the adversary
attributes to pij being used.
Models can be used to represent states of knowledge of varied precision. In
particular, the environment En itself is a model of an adversary with unabridged
knowledge, whereas the point hyper [piEn] is the model of an adversary with only
concise knowledge. Here we are interested also in models of intermediate levels of
adversarial knowledge lying in between these two extreme cases. In particular, as
we show in the next example, a model’s strategies may not directly match those
of the true environment, but rather abstract information in that environment in
a consistent manner.
Example 6. Consider the password system from Example 1, but assume now that
the environment En of execution consists in six possible strategies, as depicted in
Table 4a. The model of knowledge of an adversary who can always identify the
user logging into the system is the environment En itself. As for an adversary who
can never identify the user logging in, the model of knowledge is the expected
behavior of all users, represented by the point hyper [piEn] in Table 4c.
Consider now another adversary who cannot exactly identify the user logging
into the system, but can determine from what state in the country the user is at-
tempting to login (for instance, by observing the IP of the request). Assume also
that users pi1, pi2 come from state A, users pi3, pi4 come from state B, and users
pi5, pi6 come from state C. The model of knowledge for this adversary, depicted
as hyper F in Table 4b, consists in three strategies piA, piB and piC representing
the expected pattern of password generation in states A, B and C, respectively.
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The difference in strategies piA, piB and piC can capture the different frequency
of passwords from state to state (caused, e.g., by regional uses of slangs, names
of cities, etc.). The probability assigned by the adversary to each strategy cor-
responding to a state is given by the probability of any given user coming from
that state. For instance, the probability F(piA) of strategy corresponding to state
A is given by F(piA)=En(pi1)+En(pi2)=1/10+1/10=2/10, and strategy piA itself is
obtained as the expectation of all strategies of users coming from that state:
piA=En(pi1)/F(piA)·pi1+En(pi2)/F(piA)·pi2=1/10/2/10·[1, 0]+1/10/2/10·[0, 1]=[1/2, 1/2]. uunionsq
Model F of Example 6 can be conveniently represented using a matrix rep-
resentation of hypers as follows. First, note that any hyper H:DSX induces a
joint probability distribution pH:D(X×SX ) on secrets and strategies, defined as
pH(xi, pij)=H(pij)pij(xi). For a hyper H, we let H
joint be the |X |×|SX | matrix in
which Hjoint(i, j)=pH(i, j). For instance, in Example 6 we have that
Enjoint =
[
1/10 0 1/10 3/40 3/20 1/30
0 1/10 1/10 9/40 1/20 2/30
]
, and Fjoint =
[
1/10 7/40 11/60
1/10 13/40 7/60
]
.
Conversely, using the usual concepts of marginalization and conditioning, given
any joint distribution pH we can recover the corresponding hyper H. Because of
that, we shall equate a hyper H with its corresponding joint distribution pH, and,
equivalently, with its matrix representation Hjoint.
AState =
piApiBpiC︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 1


pi1
pi2
pi3
pi4
pi5
pi6
Second, the adversary’s incapability of distinguish-
ing users within a state can be modeled by the matrix
AState on the side, which maps each strategy corre-
sponding to a user in the environment to a strategy
corresponding to a state in the model. It can be eas-
ily verified that the hyper F in its joint form can be
recovered as the product of the environment En in its
joint form with AState, i.e., Fjoint=Enjoint×AState.
Although in Example 6 the adversary could only deterministically aggregate
strategies together, in general models can be the result of an adversary probabilis-
tically identifying a trait of the strategy used. Moreover, note that the adversary
does not need to know the exact strategy from each user first, to only then ag-
gregate them into the expected behavior of the state. He could, for instance,
obtain the average behavior from the state directly from a log of passwords in
which only the user’s state of origin is known.
Formally, let p(µ | pi) be the probability of the adversary modeling the context
as strategy µ:SX when in reality it is strategy pi:SX . A model M for environ-
ment En obtained using distribution p(µ | pi) assigns to each strategy µ outer
probability
M(µ) =
∑
pi
p(µ | pi) · En(pi), where µ =
∑
pi
p(µ | pi) · pi. (4)
The formulas in Equation (4) are equivalent to the following characterization
of the abstraction of a model into another in terms of “aggregation matrices”. An
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aggregation matrix A is a |SX |×|SX | channel matrix in which each entry A(i, j)
is the probability p(pi | µ) of the adversary mapping strategy pi to strategy µ.
Definition 3 (Abstraction of a hyper). A hyper H′ is an abstraction of
another hyper H, denoted by H′vH, iff H′=H·A for some aggregation matrix A.
Definition 3 says that an abstraction M can be obtained as the result of post-
processing the environment En with an aggregation matrix A that makes convex
combinations of actual strategies. The matrix A can be seen as the adversary’s
capability of correctly identifying the context of execution. In particular, when
A is the identity matrix I, the resulting abstraction is the environment itself:
En=En·I. When A is the non-interferent channel 0, the resulting abstraction is
the point-hyper [pi]=En·0. 10 In particular, because in Example 6 the adversary
can only group whole strategies together based on state, the aggregation matrix
AState is deterministic.
As a sanity check, the following result shows that the result of post-processing
a hyper with a channel matrix is itself a hyper with same expectation, which
implies that all abstractions are consistent with the prior distribution.
Proposition 4. If H is a hyper of type D2X and A is a channel matrix from
X to any domain Y, then H·A is also a hyper of type D2X . Moreover, if we call
H′=H·A, then the priors from both hypers are the same: piH=piH′ .
5.2 Vulnerability of the secret given an abstraction
We will now generalize the definition of environmental vulnerability of the secret
(in which the adversary is assumed to have unabridged knowledge), to scenarios
in which the adversary’s knowledge is an abstraction M of the environment En.
The key insight of this measure is that, whereas the adversary’s actions are
chosen depending on his modeling of the context as strategy µ from M, his
actual gain should be measured according to the real strategy pi coming from
the environment En. We formalize this below, recalling that, from Theorem 1
we know that every continuous and convex vulnerability VX can be written as
a g-vulnerability Vg for some suitable g.
Definition 4. The vulnerability of the secret in an environment En when the
adversary’s model is abstraction M is given by
VmdX (M,En) =
∑
pi
En(pi)
∑
µ
A(µ, pi)
∑
x
pi(x) g(wµ, x), (5)
where wµ= argmaxw
∑
x µ(x)g(w, x) is the adversary’s optimal guess if the secret
were actually distributed according to strategy µ.
10 The non-interferent channel 0 is a column-matrix in which all rows are identical,
and for that reason it allows no flow of information from inputs to outputs.
15
Note that Equation (5) is defined only when p(µ | pi)=A(µ, pi) is well defined,
that is, when there exists an aggregation matrix A making MvEn.
The following result states that the vulnerability of the secret for an adversary
who reasons according to an abstraction (as per Equation (5)) is the same as
environmental vulnerability in case this abstraction were the real environment.
Proposition 5. For any vulnerability VX , environment En and model M, if
MvEn then VmdX (M,En)=VenX (M).
Proposition 5 has a few interesting consequences. First, it implies that the
definition of VmdX (M,En) generalizes environmental and traditional prior vul-
nerabilities: when the adversary’s model is M=En, we have that VmdX (M,En)=
VenX (En), and his model is M=[piEn], we have that VmdX ([pi],En)=VenX ([pi])=VX(pi).
More importantly, though, Proposition 5 provides a precise information-
theoretic characterization of our definition of abstractions for an environment.
More precisely, it can be used to show that by using a more refined model an
adversary can never be worse off than by using a less refined model.
Proposition 6. If M′,M are abstractions for an environment En, then M′vM
iff VmdX (M′,En)≤VmdX (M,En) for all vulnerabilities VX .
5.3 Strategy vulnerability given an abstraction
Next, we will generalize strategy vulnerability to the scenario in which the ad-
versary reasons according to an abstraction M of the environment En.
Our definition is analogous to that of strategy vulnerability, and it is based
on the observation that a strategy is vulnerable given a model to the extent the
average behavior of the model can be used to infer the strategy being used. In
other words, the strategy is protected if knowledge about the model does not
give information about what strategy is being used.
Definition 5. Given a vulnerability VX , the corresponding strategy vulnerabil-
ity given an abstraction M within an environment En is defined as
VstS (En,M)
def
=
VmdX (M,En)
VenX (En)
=
VenX (M)
VenX (En)
,
where the second equality stems from Proposition 5.
The next result shows that a more refined abstraction never yields smaller
strategy vulnerability than a less refined abstraction for the same environment.
Proposition 7. Given two abstractions M and M′ of an environment En, M′vM
iff VstS (M′,En)≤VstS (M,En) for all vulnerabilities VX .
Proposition 7 implies bounds on strategy vulnerability given an abstraction.
Proposition 8. Given any vulnerability VX , for any environment En and any
abstraction MvEn, VstS (En)≤VstS (M,En)≤1, with equality for the lower bound
occurring when M=[piEn], and equality for the upper bound occurring when M=En.
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Finally, we note that Definition 5 naturally extends the decomposition rule
of Equation (3) and the definitions of different types of security as follows.
VmdX (M,En)︸ ︷︷ ︸
perceived security
given a model
= VstS (En,M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
security by aggregation
given a model
× VenX (En)︸ ︷︷ ︸
security by strategy
given a model
.
An interesting observation. The following observation means that the in-
crease in accuracy given by a more refined abstraction M over a less refined
abstraction M′ is the same for secrets and for strategies. If M′vMvEn then
VstS (En,M′)
VstS (En,M)
=
VenX (M′)
VenX (En)
× V
en
X (En)
VenX (M)
=
VenX (M′)
VenX (M)
. (6)
Making M=En in Equation (6) we recover the definition of strategy vulnera-
bility: VstS (En)=VX(X)/VenX (En). Making M′=[piEn] in Equation (6) we obtain that
the increase in information about secrets and the increase in information about
strategies provided by a model is the same: VstS (En)/VstS (En,M)=VX(X)/VenX (M).
6 On the expressiveness of hypers
Hyper distributions play an essential role in this paper to generalize the modeling
of secret-generation process and the adversary’s prior knowledge about it. Hav-
ing gone from distributions over secrets to distributions over distributions over
secrets, one might wonder whether further levels of distribution (i.e., “higher-
order” hypers of type DnX , for n>2) might be necessary to fully account for
adversary knowledge. The simple answer is no.
The core idea is that a hyper corresponds to a joint distribution in D(X×Y)
for some set Y of labels for distributions on X . Likewise, an object of type
Dn+1X corresponds to a joint distribution in D(X×Y1× · · ·×Yn), which is itself
equivalent to a joint distribution in D(X×Y) where Y=Y1× · · ·×Yn. But note
that D(X×Y) is equivalent to a hyper of type D2X . Hence, any “higher-order”
hyper is equivalent to some regular hyper of type D2X and, moreover, both
objects preserve the same distribution on distributions on X . Since measures of
the vulnerability of the secret are functions of distributions on X , the user of
“higher-order” hypers is not necessary to measure vulnerability.
To make this idea precise, let pin range over objects of type DnX . If the
adversary’s knowledge is represented by pin (for some n≥2), it is natural to
define the vulnerability of the secret as the expectation of the vulnerabilities
of hypers of lower order. A vulnerability of order n is a function Vn:DnX→R
s.t. V1(pi1)=VX(pi1), and Vn(pin)=Epin Vn−1 for n ≥ 2. In particular, V1(pi1)=
VX(pi1) is the traditional vulnerability on secrets, and V2(pi2)=Epi2 VX is envi-
ronmental vulnerability. The next result shows that an adversary who reasons
according to a model of type DnX for some n≥2 is only as well off as an adversary
with an appropriate model of type D2X .
Proposition 9. For every pin:DnX , with n≥2, Vn(pin)=V2(pi2), where pi2:D2X
is the hyper resulting from marginalizing the joint of pin w.r.t. Y2×Y3× . . .×Yn−1.
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7 Case study
To illustrate the utility of our model, we synthesize an environment based on
the RockYou password dataset [22], which contains the un-hashed passwords
of around 32 million users of the RockYou gaming site. We construct several
abstractions for this environment, computing for each of them the corresponding
vulnerability of the secret and strategy vulnerability, and show how they relate.
To synthesize the environment, we begin by reducing the 32 million pass-
words to the around 350 thousand passwords that contain a string suggesting
the birth year of the password’s owner (the strings “1917” through “1995”). We
assume that each of these passwords was generated by a distinct user, and con-
struct a deterministic strategy for each of these users. The intention is that each
strategy represents the user’s exact preference at the time they selected their
password. The environment consists in these strategies distributed according to
their relative frequency in the database.
To construct abstractions for this environment, we attribute to each user the
birth year used in their password, as well as a randomly chosen gender. The first
abstraction, called Omniscient, is the environment itself, and it represents an
adversary with unabridged knowledge. Although this level of knowledge is be-
yond any realistic adversary, it will illustrate the limiting values of vulnerability.
To construct the Age abstraction, we partition users into blocks according
to their birth year. From each block we derive a distribution on passwords rep-
resenting the expected strategy for a person born in that year. This produces
one strategy for each birth year from 1917 through 1995, and the probability of
each strategy is determined by the relative frequency of each birth year.
The Gender abstraction aggregates users by gender, and contains one strat-
egy representing the expected behavior of males and of females. Since we assigned
genders to users uniformly at random, these two strategies each occur with equal
probability (0.5) and are mostly similar.
Finally, the Prior abstraction has only one strategy in its support that ag-
gregates all of the 350 thousand users, with each password’s probability being
proportional to its relative frequency. This environment is equivalent to the point
hyper [pi] containing only the prior distribution on secrets.
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1990 (0.0488)
1960 (0.00430)
1930 (0.000919)
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all (1.0)
female (0.5)
male (0.5)
Fig. 2: Example strategies and their probabilities
in several environments.
Several strategies in the
last three abstractions are vi-
sualized in Figure 2. The
“all” line shows the probabil-
ity of various passwords be-
ing picked in the Prior envi-
ronment, sorted by their rank
(most probable first). The
two gender aggregate strate-
gies from the Gender envi-
ronment are labeled “male”
and “female” (note that “male”, “female” and “all” largely coincide). Finally,
three example years from the Age environment are labeled “1930”, “1960”, and
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V(Bayes)X (pi) = V
en(Bayes)
X (En) × Vst(Bayes)S (En)
Omni 2−11.892 = 2−0 × 2−11.892
Age 2−11.892 = 2−7.442 × 2−4.450
Gender 2−11.892 = 2−11.876 × 2−0.0158
Prior 2−11.892 = 2−11.892 × 2−0
Table 5: Bayes vulnerability decomposition.
“1990”. The Bayes vulnerability of each strategy is the probability of the rank 1
password and min-entropy is negation of the base 2 exponent of that probability.
The decomposition of prior Bayes vulnerability as per Definition 2 is sum-
marized in Table 5. Note that the vulnerability in the prior is around 2−11.892 =
2.632·10−4. An adversary who can learn the user’s gender could achieve vulnera-
bility of 2−11.876=2.66084·10−4. The strategy vulnerability here shows negligible
advantage over the prior as we synthesized the gender uniformly. On the other
hand, an adversary reasoning according to the aggregation by age, the vulner-
ability of the secret is 2−7.442=57.526 · 10−4, providing the equivalent of 4.450
bits of information over the prior when measured as min-entropy.
These measurements let us reach several conclusions. First, the (environmen-
tal) vulnerability of the prior forms a baseline level of security in the authenti-
cation system for the users in this experiment. The measurements for age and
gender abstractions, on the other hand, gauge the effective security under the
pessimistic assumption that users’ age or gender (respectively) can be discovered
by an adversary. The complement (strategy vulnerability) of these measurements
give the relative importance of keeping these demographics secret. In this case,
gender is unimportant, while age encodes a significant amount of a password’s
entropy. A system designer should be wary of displaying age on user profiles.
8 Related work
Our work is mainly motivated by the questions raised by the model of Mardziel
et al. [14] for dynamic secrets that evolve over time, and that may vary as the
system interacts with its environment. Their model also considers secrets that
are generated according to a strategy, and they give an example that an evolving
secret subject to repeated observations, in some cases, can be learned faster if
it is changed (and observed) more often. They suggest that this effect is related
to the lack of randomness within the strategy for generating secrets, but they
do not develop a formal measure of that randomness. In [23] the authors take a
step further and distinguish between adversary’s and defender’s goals, but they
still do not have results about the vulnerability of the strategy itself.
Hyper-distributions were introduced in [20] to model the adversary’s pos-
terior knowledge about the secret (i.e., after an observation of the system is
performed). The inners of the hyper are conditional distributions on secrets
given each possible observable produced by the system, and the outer is a dis-
tribution on the observables. Several other models for QIF have used hypers in
a similar way (e.g., [24, 12, 21]), but all of them still model prior knowledge
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as a single distribution on secrets. Our work models prior knowledge itself as a
hyper-distribution, in which the inners are strategies for generating secrets, and
the outer is a distribution on strategies.
Several models investigate systems in which secrets are correlated in interac-
tive systems. Some approaches capture interactivity in systems by encoding it
as a single “batch job” execution. Desharnais et al. [25], for instance, model the
system as a channel matrix of conditional probabilities of whole output traces
given whole input traces. O’Neill et al. [26], based on Wittbold and Johnson [27],
improve on batch-job models by introducing strategies. The strategy functions
of O’Neill et al. are deterministic, whereas ours are probabilistic.
Clark and Hunt [28], following O’Neill et al., investigate a hierarchy of strate-
gies. Stream strategies, at the bottom of the hierarchy, are equivalent to having
agents provide all their inputs before system execution as a stream of values.
But probabilities are essential for information-theoretic quantification of infor-
mation flow. Clark and Hunt do not address quantification, instead focusing on
the more limited problem of noninterference.
The work of Shokri et al. [29] strives to quantify the privacy of users of
location-based services using Markov models and various machine learning tech-
niques for constructing and applying them. Shokri et al.’s work employs two
phases, one for learning a model of how a principal’s location could change over
time, and one for de-anonymizing subsequently observed, but obfuscated, loca-
tion information using this model. Our work focuses on information theoretic
characterizations of security in such applications, and allows for the quantifica-
tion of how much information is learned about the strategies themselves.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we generalized the representation of the adversary’s prior knowl-
edge about the secret from a single probability distribution on secrets to an
environment, which is a distribution on strategies for generating secrets. This
generalization allowed us to derive relevant extensions of the traditional ap-
proaches to QIF, including measures of environmental vulnerability, strategy
vulnerability, and to disentangle security by strategy and security by aggrega-
tion, two concepts usually conflated in traditional approaches to QIF.
We are currently working on the extending the notion of strategies to model
secrets that evolve over time, and on the corresponding quantification of strategy
leakage when secrets are processed by a system.
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A Notes on hyper-distributions.
Here we establish properties of hyper-distributions used in our proofs of technical
results.
Recalling our notation, let X={x1, x2, . . . , xn} be a set of secret values, and
DX be the set of all probability distributions on X . Let SX={pi1, pi2, . . . , piµ} ⊂
DX be a set of strategies of interest. 11 We use letters like H, M, En to denote
hypers, and, unless stated otherwise, we will concentrate on hypers that are
distributions on strategies of interest, i.e., on hypers of type DSX . 12 We denote
by pij(xi) the probability of secret xi being generated by strategy pij , and by
H(pij) the (outer) probability of strategy pij being used in hyper H.
A hyper H induces a joint probability distribution pH:D(X×SX ) on secrets
and strategies, obtained as pH(xi, pij)=H(pij)pij(xi). Conversely, given the joint
distribution pH(xi, pij) we can recover the corresponding hyper H using marginal-
ization and conditioning in the usual way. More precisely, the outer distribution
of hyper H is recovered as H(pij)=
∑
xi
p(xi, pij) for each strategy pij , and the
probability of any secret xi given strategy pij is recovered as pij(xi)=p
H(xi,pij)/H(pij)
if H(pij)>0. Note that if H(pij)=0, we can pick any inner distribution pij∈SX to
be the corresponding inner without altering the hyper (for instance, we can take
the uniform inner in which pij(xi)=1/|X | for every xi). For that reason, we will
often equate a hyper H with its joint distribution pH.
Using marginalization and conditioning in the usual way, a joint distribution
pH:D(X×SX ) corresponding to a hyper can also be decomposed into a prior
distribution piH on secrets and a conditional distribution p
H
S|X of strategies given
secrets. More precisely, piH=
∑
j H(pij)pij is the prior consistent with hyper H,
and for each strategy pij and secret xi we have p
H
S|X(pij | xi)=pH(xi,pij)/piH(xi) if
piH(xi)>0. Note that if piH(xi)=0, we can pick any inner distribution on SX to
be the corresponding pij without altering the hyper (for instance, we can make
take the uniform inner such that pHS|X(pij | xi)=1/|dHe|).
The decomposition of a hyper into a prior on secrets and conditional prob-
abilities on strategies given secrets can also be represented in a matrix form as
follows. Let Hjoint denote the |X |×|SX | matrix corresponding to hyper H in that
Hjoint(i, j)=pH(xi, pij). Let DpiH denote the |X |×|X | diagonal matrix in which,
for all 1≤i, j≤|X |, DpiH(i, i)=piH(xi), and DpiH(i, j)=0, whenever i 6=j. Define ∆H
as a |X |×|SX | matrix in which ∆H(i, j)=pHS|X(pij | xi). Clearly ∆H is a channel
matrix mapping secrets to strategies. We can show that any hyper H:DSX can
be obtained as the matrix multiplication
Hjoint = DpiH ·∆H, (7)
11 Given that X is finite, we can make SX finite via a discretization that defines an
indivisible amount µ of probability mass that strategies can allocate among secrets.
Any precision in strategies can be achieved by making µ as small as needed.
12 Note that DSX ⊂ D2X , so in general all definitions and results that apply to objects
of type D2X will also apply to objects of type DSX .
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since for all xi∈X and pij∈SX :
Hjoint(i, j) =
∑
k
DpiH(i, k)∆H(k, j) (def. of matrix multiplication)
= DpiH(i, i)∆H(i, j) (DpiH(i, k) 6= 0 only when i = k)
= piH(xi) · pHS|X(pij | xi) (by def. of DpiH and ∆H)
= pH(xi, pij).
Example 7. The hyper H below
pi1 pi2 pi3
x1 1 0 1/2
x2 0 1 1/2
H 1/4 1/4 1/2
can be written as a joint matrix Hjoint and as the product of a prior piH and a
channel matrix ∆H from secrets to strategies as follows.[
1/4 0 1/4
0 1/4 1/4
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hjoint
=
[
1/2 0
0 1/2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
DpiH
·
[
1/2 0 1/2
0 1/2 1/2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆H
uunionsq
Putting the above observations together, we see that any hyper H can be
expressed as the result of pushing a prior through a channel ∆H as follows.
Proposition 10. Every hyper H:DSX can be written as
H = [piH, ∆H],
where piH=E H is the consistent prior with H, and ∆H is the |X |×|SX | channel
matrix from secrets to strategies in which ∆H(i, j)=p
H
S|X(pij | xi).
A direct consequence of Proposition 10, is that the environmental vulnera-
bility of a hyper H can be expressed as the posterior g-vulnerability of channel
∆H for hyper piH.
Corollary 1. For any vulnerability VX and any hyper H:DSX , there exists a Vg
such that
VenX (H) = Vg[piH, ∆H].
The next result shows that if a H′ is an abstraction of another hyper H via
aggregation matrix A, then the channel ∆H′ from secrets to strategies in H
′ can
be obtained as the cascading of the channel ∆H from secrets to strategies in H
and the aggregation matrix A.
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Lemma 1. For any aggregation matrix A, H′=HA iff ∆H′=∆HA.
Proof. Assume H′=HA for some aggregation matrix A. Then, by Proposition 4
we know that piH′=piH. Hence
H = H′A (by hypothesis)
= DpiH′∆H′A (H
′=DpiH′∆H′ by Equation (7))
= DpiH∆H′A (by Proposition 4).
But notice that we can decompose H into DpiH∆H. Combining this with the
derivation above, we conclude that ∆H=∆H′A. uunionsq
An important observation is that the construction of models via aggregation
matrices means that the adversary’s identification of a strategy as a context of
execution is independent from the actual secret value, given the actual strategy.
Formally, if MvEn then for all secrets x, strategies µ in M and strategies pi in
En: p(µ | pi, x)=p(µ | pi). As a direct consequence, the probability of any secret
is independent of the abstracted model, given the original model.
Lemma 2. If MvEn then for all secrets x, strategies µ in M, and strategies pi
in En, p(x | µ, pi)=p(x | pi)=pi(x).
Proof. If MvEn then for all secrets x, strategies µ in M and strategies pi in En
we have p(µ | pi, x)=p(µ | pi). Hence, also for all x, µ, pi:
p(x | µ, pi) = p(x, µ, pi)
p(µ, pi)
(by definition of conditional prob.)
=
En(pi) · pi(x) · p(µ | x, pi)
En(pi) · p(µ | pi) (by the chain rule for probabilities)
= pix (since p(µ | x, pi) = p(µ | pi))
= p(x | pi).
uunionsq
B Proofs of technical results.
B.1 Preliminaries for proofs
The following definitions and results from the literature will be needed in our
proofs.
Theorem 2 (Jensen’s inequality). If f is a convex (^) function, λ1, λ2, . . . ,
λn are convex coefficients, and x1, x2, . . . , xn are arbitrary, then
f
(∑
i
λixi
)
≤
∑
i
λif(xi).
In particular, if X is a random variable and f is a convex (^) function,
f
(
EX
)
≤E f(X).
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Theorem 3 (“Miracle” [19]). For any channel C and g-vulnerability Vg,
max
pi
(
log2
Vg[pi,C]
Vg(pi)
)
≤ log2
V (Bayes)[pi,C]
V (Bayes)(pi)
.
The next result states that g-vulnerabilities provide a precise information-
theoretic meaning to the composition refinement relation on channels. We say
a channel C from X to Y (composition) refines a channel C ′ from X to Z (or,
equivalently, that C ′ is (composition) refined by C), denoted by C ′v◦C, if there
is a channel matrix R from Y to Z such that C ′=CR. The next result states
that a channel C refines a channel C ′ iff for all gain functions and priors, the
posterior g-vulnerability of the secret given channel C ′ never exceeds that of the
secret given channel C.
Theorem 4 (Composition refinement and strong g-vulnerability or-
dering [19, 12]). For any two channel matrices C, C ′, C ′v◦C iff Vg[pi,C ′]≤
Vg[pi,C] for all priors pi and gain functions g.
B.2 Proofs of Section 3
Proposition 1. For all environments En, if En=[pi] then VenX (En)=VX(pi).
Proof. For all point-hyper environments En:
VenX (En) =E
En
VX (by definition of VenX )
= 1 · VX(pi) (since En = [pi])
= VX(pi).
uunionsq
B.3 Proofs of Section 4
Proposition 2. For any vulnerability VX , VenX (En)≥VX(piEn) for all environ-
ments En.
Proof. Given that VenX is a convex function, for every environment En we can
make use of Jensen’s inequality as follows.
VenX (En) =E
En
VX (by definition of VenX )
≥ VX
(
EEn
)
(by Jensen’s inequality and convexity of VenX )
= VX (piEn) (by definition of piEn)
uunionsq
Proposition 3. Given any vulnerability VX , strategy vulnerability is bounded
by VstS (En)≥V(Bayes)X (piEn)/Ven(Bayes)X (En) for all environments En.
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Proof. By Corollary 1, for any environment En VstS (En) can be written as
VstS (En) =
Vg(piEn)
Vg[piEn, ∆En]
≥ V
(Bayes)(piEn)
V (Bayes)[piEn, ∆En]
(by Theorem 3, since log2 is monotonic)
=
V(Bayes)X (piEn)
Ven(Bayes)X (En)
(by Corollary 1)
uunionsq
B.4 Proofs of Section 5
Proposition 4. If H is a hyper of type D2X and A is a channel matrix from
X to any domain Y, then H·A is also a hyper of type D2X . Moreover, if we call
H′=H·A, then the priors from both hypers are the same: piH=piH′ .
Proof. By Proposition 10, H can be decomposed as [piH, ∆H]. If H
′=H·A, then by
Lemma 1 it can be expressed as H′=[piH, ∆H·A], from which the result follows.
uunionsq
Proposition 5. For any vulnerability VX , environment En and model M, if
MvEn then VmdX (M,En)=VenX (M).
Proof. First, recall that by Lemma 2, in any abstraction M for environment
En, for all x, µ, pi we have p(x | µ, pi)=p(x | pi)=pi(x), and, hence the joint
distribution is given by
p(pi, µ, x) = p(pi)p(µ | pi)p(x | µ, pi) (by the chain rule for prob.)
= p(pi)p(µ | pi)p(x | pi) (by the observation above)
= En(pi) ·A(pi, µ) · pi(x). (8)
Hence we can derive
VmdX (M,En) =
∑
pi
En(pi)
∑
µ
A(µ, pi)
∑
x
pi(x) g(wµ, x) (definition of VmdX )
=
∑
pi,µ,x
p(pi, µ, x)g(wµ, x) (by Equation (8))
=
∑
µ
p(µ)
∑
x
p(x | µ)
∑
pi
p(pi | µ, x)g(wµ, x) (chain rule of prob.)
=
∑
µ
M(µ)
∑
x
µ(x)g(wµ, x)
∑
pi
p(pi | µ, x)
=
∑
µ
M(µ)
∑
x
µ(x)g(wµ, x) (
∑
pi p(pi | µ, x) = 1)
= Vg(X | M)
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= VenX (M)
uunionsq
The following auxiliary result states that the more refined is an abstraction
for an environment, the greater the corresponding environmental vulnerability.
Lemma 3. If M′,M are abstractions for an environment En, then M′vM iff
VenX (M′)≤VenX (M) for all VX .
Proof. If M′vM, by Proposition 10 and Lemma 1 we know there is a prior pi
and channel matrices ∆M and A such that M=[piM , ∆M] and M
′=[piM , ∆MA]. By
Theorem 4 we know that Vg[piM, ∆MA]≤Vg[piM′ , ∆M′ ], for all Vg, and hence by
Corollary 1 we have that VenX (M′)≤VenX (M). uunionsq
Proposition 6. If M′,M are abstractions for an environment En, then M′vM
iff VmdX (M′,En)≤VmdX (M,En) for all vulnerabilities VX .
Proof. Just combine Lemma 3 with Proposition 5. uunionsq
Proposition 7. Given two abstractions M and M′ of an environment En, M′vM
iff VstS (M′,En)≤VstS (M,En) for all vulnerabilities VX .
Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that M′vM iff VenX (M′)≤VenX (M) for all VX .
By noting that VstS (M′,En)=V
en
X (M
′)/VenX (En) and VstS (M,En)=V
en
X (M)/VenX (En), and
VenX (En) is the same in non-negative value in the denominator of both fractions,
the result follows. uunionsq
Proposition 8. Given any vulnerability VX , for any environment En and any
abstraction MvEn, VstS (En)≤VstS (M,En)≤1, with equality for the lower bound
occurring when M=[piEn], and equality for the upper bound occurring when M=En.
Proof. Note that the most refined abstraction of any environment En is the
environment itself, and that the least refined abstraction is the point-hyper [piEn].
This implies, from Proposition 7, that the lower bound on VstS (En,M) is achieved
when M=[piEn], so
VstS (En, [piEn]) =
VenX ([piEn])
VenX (En)
(by definition of VstS given an abstraction)
=
VX(piEn)
VenX (En)
(by Proposition 1)
= VstS (En), (by definition of VstS )
and the upper bound on VstS (En,M) is achieved when M=En, so
VstS (En,En) =
VenX (En)
VenX (En)
(by definition of VstS given an abstraction)
= 1.
uunionsq
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B.5 Proofs of Section 6
In this section we need the following definitions and notation. A hyper of de-
gree n, or n-hyper, on X is an object of type DnX , where D1X=DX and DnX=
D
(
Dn−1X ) for n ≥ 2. We let pin range of hypers of degree n. In particular, pi1:DX
is a prior on secrets, and pi2:D2X is a hyper-distribution. Any n-hyper pin can
be represented as a joint distribution pX×Y1×...×Yn−1 on the Cartesian product
X×Y1×Y2× . . .×Yn−1 in which each Yi is a set of labels for all hypers pii−1 of or-
der i−1, and Yi is the associated random variable. We may denote pX×Y1×...×Yn−1
simply by pX×Y . Given a joint pX×Y , we denote by pX×Y |≥Yi , for 1≤i≤n−1, the
joint pX×Y1×...×Yi−1|Yi...Yn−1 on X×Y1×Y2× . . .×Yi−1 obtained by marginaliza-
tion of pX×Y1×...×Yn−1 w.r.t. Yi×Yi+1×. . .×Yn−1. Analogously, given a hyper pin
of type DnX , for 1≤i≤n−1 we denote by pii the hyper of type DiX corresponding
to the marginalization of pin w.r.t. to Yi×Yi+1×. . .×Yn−1. Recall that we defined
a vulnerability of order n as a function Vn:DnX→R s.t. V1(pi1)=VX(pi1), and
Vn(pin)=Epin Vn−1 for n ≥ 2. In particular, V1(pi1)=VX(pi1) is the traditional
vulnerability on secrets, and V2(pi2)=Epi2 VX is environmental vulnerability.
The next result shows that an adversary who reasons according to a model
of type DnX for some n≥2 can do as great as a job as an adversary with an
appropriate model of type D2X .
Proposition 9. For every pin:DnX , with n≥2, Vn(pin)=V2(pi2), where pi2:D2X
is the hyper resulting from marginalizing the joint of pin w.r.t. Y2×Y3× . . .×Yn−1.
Proof. By induction on the degree n of the hyper. For the base case, note that
pi2=pi2 and, hence, V2(pi2)=V2(pi2). As for the inductive case, for any n≥2,
Vn(pin) can be written as:
E
pin
Vn−1
= (expanding the summation)∑
yn−1∈Yn−1
pX×Y (yn−1)Vn−1(pX×Y |≥Yn−1)
= (by definition of Vn−1)∑
yn−1∈Yn−1
pX×Y (yn−1)
∑
yn−2∈Yn−2
pX×Y |≥Yn−1(yn−2)V
n−2(pX×Y |≥Yn−2)
= (groupping the summation)∑
(yn−1,yn−2)∈Yn−1×Yn−2
pX×Y |≥Yn−2(yn−1, yn−2)V
n−2(pX×Y |≥Yn−2)
= (by definition of pin−1)
Vn−1(pin−1)
= (by the induction hypothesis)
V2(pi2).
uunionsq
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